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An important goal of clinical practice in autism is improv-
ing an individual’s social functioning. One key target for 
this process may be the ability to describe and identify 
one’s own emotions. While many terms have been used to 
describe this ability (Kashdan et al., 2015), for this review, 
we use the term ‘emotional self-awareness’. Recent review 
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Abstract
Emotional self-awareness is increasingly suggested to be an area of difficulty in autism that may predict socioemotional 
outcomes for this population. However, whether emotional self-awareness is consistently diminished in autism across 
age and methodology remains unclear. We systematically reviewed 47 papers measuring emotional self-awareness in 
autistic (n = 1387) and non-autistic (n = 1433) participants. Most studies relied on self-report. Of studies testing for 
group differences, the majority (32/41) found significantly poorer emotional self-awareness in autism. Meta-analyses of 
self-report measures found that emotional self-awareness was significantly poorer in autism (d = 1.16). However, when 
examining age groups individually, autistic children of age 12 years and under were not significantly different from their 
peers (d = 0.03). Instead, difficulties emerged during adolescence (d = 0.63) and increased with age (d = 1.16 – 1.58). The 
pattern of emotional self-awareness difficulties being more common in autism, and worsening with age is similar to the 
development of mental health difficulties in autism. However, findings rely on self-perception and so may reflect poor 
self-beliefs of socioemotional competence. We propose that negative self-beliefs in autistic populations may account for 
findings of low emotional self-awareness.
Lay abstract
Autistic people are thought to have difficulties with identifying and understanding their own emotions. This is referred to 
as emotional self-awareness. It is important to study emotional self-awareness as people who are more able to understand 
their own emotions, whether they are autistic or not, are more able to respond to them appropriately, as well as to identify 
them in other people. It has not yet been confirmed whether autistic people have difficulties with emotional self-awareness, 
or if any reported difficulties are actually due to the way in which emotional self-awareness is measured in autistic people. 
If these difficulties do exist, it is also not known when these difficulties emerge. In this research, we reviewed 47 existing 
studies that measured emotional self-awareness in autistic and non-autistic adults and children. We also compared studies 
that measured emotional self-awareness in different ways. We found that autistic adults did seem to have poorer emotional 
self-awareness compared to their neurotypical peers. However, this was not the case with autistic children of age 12 years 
and below. Instead, differences in emotional self-awareness only seemed to emerge during adolescence. Moreover, these 
difficulties seemed to increase with age. These results suggest that difficulties with emotional self-awareness may not be 
inherent in autism. Instead, they may emerge alongside the greater social and mental health difficulties that are experienced 
by many autistic people during adolescence. We therefore suggest that it is important to find out more about, and 
subsequently support, the emotional self-awareness difficulties that autistic adolescents may encounter.
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work suggests that emotional self-awareness is diminished 
in autism (Kinnaird et al., 2019) and that these difficulties 
predict poorer emotional contagion and recognition in this 
population (Bird & Cook, 2013).
This is the second part of a two-part review. In the first 
review (Huggins et al., 2020), we qualitatively reviewed 
how emotional self-awareness was conceptualised, defined 
and measured in autism research, finding that emotional 
self-awareness is usually assessed with self-report, and 
tends to be inconsistently defined. In this review, we exam-
ine group differences in emotional self-awareness across 
the different measurement tools between autistic and non-
autistic groups with meta-analysis. We also examine 
developmental patterns of emotional self-awareness.
A long-standing theory is that the social difficulties of 
autism are rooted in delayed development of ‘Theory of 
Mind’ (ToM)–the ability to represent the mental states of 
oneself and others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Perner et al., 
1989). Although studies consistently find that autistic chil-
dren struggle to report their own mental states (Williams, 
2010), most research has focused on understanding the 
minds of others. However, the ability to represent one’s 
own mind may be fundamental to representing the minds 
of others (Decety & Meyer, 2008), making emotional self-
awareness an increasing area of interest in autism research.
Much research on emotional self-awareness in autism 
has focused on alexithymia (Poquerusse et al., 2018). 
Alexithymia was originally used to describe the behav-
iours of psychosomatic patients who struggled to commu-
nicate their own emotions, tending to focus on external 
stimuli over subjective internal experiences (Sifneos, 
1973). In contemporary research, alexithymia is frequently 
conceptualised as a trait reflecting difficulties in identify-
ing and describing one’s own emotional experiences, usu-
ally assessed with self-report (Moriguchi & Komaki, 
2013).
Recent meta-analytic work demonstrated significantly 
elevated alexithymia in autism (Kinnaird et al., 2019). A 
significant limitation of this review is that it exclusively 
surveyed studies using the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994; Taylor et al., 1985), a 
self-report questionnaire. Although it is one of the most 
commonly used, well-validated measures of alexithymia, 
the TAS-20 has some limitations.
TAS-20 scores are strongly associated with general nega-
tive affect (Lumley, 2000) and depression (Honkalampi 
et al., 2001). Longitudinal work demonstrates that TAS-20 
scores fluctuate with general mental health (Marchesi et al., 
2008, 2014). It has thus been suggested that the TAS-20 
measures general psychological distress, rather than a stable 
trait (Leising et al., 2009). Moreover, there is a high preva-
lence of mental health conditions in autism (Simonoff et al., 
2008; Lai et al., 2019). As such, greater psychological dis-
tress could account for the elevated TAS-20 scores in this 
population. Alternatively, poor emotional self-awareness, as 
measured by TAS-20 scores, may result in greater difficul-
ties regulating negative emotion and thus elevated psycho-
logical distress. Regardless, psychological distress remains 
a potential confounding factor in this relationship.
Furthermore, though self-report can provide a valuable 
source of information on subjective experiences, it is reli-
ant upon self-perception. Even in the general population, 
self-report and performance-based measures of emotional 
abilities correlate weakly (Keefer, 2015; Lumley et al., 
2005). This is unsurprising given that self-report relies on 
comparing one’s own experiences and abilities to those of 
others, which is largely impossible in emotional experi-
ence. People with poor emotional self-awareness are also 
likely to have poor awareness of their abilities (Marchesi 
et al., 2014). Difficulties with judging one’s own abilities 
may be particularly problematic in autism, due to the 
greater meta-cognitive difficulties seen in this population 
(Garfinkel et al., 2016; Grainger et al., 2014; Palser et al., 
2018).
The focus on ‘alexithymia’ also overlooks similar con-
structs which have arisen to measure emotional self-
awareness (Kashdan et al., 2015). Alexithymia is largely 
conceptualised as a deficit based on behaviours in clinical 
populations (Sifneos, 1973). Other definitions conceptual-
ise emotional self-awareness as an ability, such as in emo-
tional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), and do not 
contain externally-oriented thinking. For instance, emo-
tion differentiation focuses specifically on how well an 
individual differentiates between similar emotional experi-
ences (Barrett et al., 2001). The overlap between these 
similar concepts remains poorly understood. Throughout 
this article, we use ‘emotional self-awareness’ as an 
umbrella term. When referring to outcomes from a meas-
ure, we will use the term specified by that measure (e.g. 
referring to TAS-20 scores as representing ‘alexithymia’). 
Examining whether emotional self-awareness is dimin-
ished in autism across methodologies and approaches 
would help us to determine whether current findings arise 
from use of the TAS-20.
Another question raised by Kinnaird et al. (2019) is 
whether emotional self-awareness is affected by develop-
ment. They found that increasing age was associated with 
greater alexithymia, across both autistic and non-autistic 
groups and suggested this may result from greater rates of 
depression and anxiety in adulthood. In the general popu-
lation, increasing age is associated with poorer emotional 
self-awareness (Mattila et al., 2006), and such a decline 
may be particularly pertinent in autism. However, Kinnaird 
et al. examined how alexithymia levels change with age 
across groups, but not changes in the difference between 
groups.
Addressing when emotional self-awareness difficulties 
arise may also help pinpoint the aetiology of such prob-
lems. If difficulties with emotional self-awareness are 
widely present from an early age, emotional self-awareness 
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difficulties may be linked to fundamental issues in autism, 
such as delayed ToM (Happé, 1995). However, if emo-
tional self-awareness difficulties emerge at a later point, 
this would suggest that they stem from other causes, such 
as co-occurring mental health problems.
We aimed to (a) assess if there are significant impair-
ments in emotional self-awareness in autism when meas-
ured with different measurement tools, including those 
outside of targeting emotional self-awareness concepts 
outside of alexithymia, and (b) assess how emotional self-
awareness changes during development in autistic and 
typical development groups.
Methods
The current review followed PRISMA guidelines for sys-
tematic reviews. The protocol for the current review is reg-
istered on the PROSPERO database, identification number 
CRD42017082052 (available online at https://www.crd.
york.ac.uk/PROSPERO/display_record.php?RecordID= 
82052), and is based on literature published to May 2018. 
Qualitative comparisons of measurement tools and term 
definitions are available in a separate paper (Huggins 
et al., 2020). Please note that this review is based on the 
same literature as in this first paper (Huggins et al., 2020), 
and as such, the search strategy and eligibility criteria 
remain the same.
Eligibility criteria
Inclusion criteria were as follows: (a) participants had a 
diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), including 
Autism, Asperger’s, Pervasive Developmental Disorder–
Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), and autism spec-
trum condition (ASC); (b) the study included a healthy, 
non-autistic control group; (c) the study included at least 
one measure explicitly assessing the participant’s aware-
ness of their own emotional states, which is clearly distinct 
from measures assessing ability to identify or describe oth-
ers’ emotional states.
Items were also excluded if (a) study was not published 
in English or (b) study was not an empirical paper in a 
peer-reviewed journal.
Search strategy
Searches were conducted on the databases Scopus, Web of 
Science, ScienceDirect, PsycARTICLES, Embase, Medline 
and PsychINFO, across all published reports until May 
2018.
Databases were searched for any articles with any com-
bination of the following keywords in the Title, Abstract 
and Keywords: (1) ‘autism’ or ‘ASD’ or ‘ASC’ or ‘Autism 
Spectrum Disorder’ or ‘Autism Spectrum Condition’ or 
‘autistic’ or ‘Asperger’ or ‘PDD-NOS’ or ‘Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified’, and 
(2) ‘alexithymia’ or ‘emotional awareness’ or ‘emotional 
differentiation’ or ‘emotion differentiation’ or ‘emotional 
granularity’ or ‘emotional intelligence’ or ‘emotional com-
petence’ or ‘emotion labelling’ or ‘emotional labelling’.
Interoception, while undoubtedly relevant to emotional 
self-awareness on the theoretical level (Craig, 2003), is not 
a direct measure of subjective awareness of one’s own 
emotional states and was not included in search strategy. 
PRISMA flowchart of the search process can be seen in 
Figure 1.
Study selection and exclusions
Stage 1. Following exclusion of duplicate articles, 513 
items were identified for abstract and title screenings. 
Screening was conducted by C.F.H. and G.D. separately. 
The results of these separate screenings were collated, and 
areas of disagreement were resolved through discussion. 
Of excluded papers, 21 papers were in a language other 
than English, 180 were not empirical papers, 174 did not 
include an autistic sample, 27 did not include non-autistic 
controls and 43 did not include an explicit measure of 
emotional self-awareness. The final list of papers for full-
text screenings was 68.
After full-text screenings, 16 studies did not include 
any direct measure of emotional self-awareness, 5 were 
student dissertations, 2 did not have appropriate controls, 1 
was a conference abstract, 1 was a study protocol and 1 
was not in English. A further eight papers were excluded 
from as participants were matched by alexithymia. A final 
34 papers were agreed upon by both researchers. A stand-
ardised data form was used to extract data.
Stage 2. Initial analyses confirmed the TAS-20 as the most 
frequently used measurement tool. Further searches were 
conducted to identify any studies missing from the current 
data set using the TAS-20 that did not mention it in the 
title, abstract or key words.
Databases were searched for any articles with a combi-
nation of terms indicative of autism (see (1) above) 
‘Toronto Alexithymia Scale’ OR TAS-20. Following 
exclusion of duplicate items, 261 items were identified. 
After screening and full-text review, 11 additional papers 
were identified for inclusion.
Due to the high amount of papers identified this way, 
full-text searches were conducted for all identified meas-
urement tools. All search terms combined with previously 
used autism terms. Searches were completed in May 2018. 
Across these additional searches, only one additional paper 
was identified for inclusion and one additional paper was 
further identified by word of mouth. The final data set con-
sisted of 47 papers, which can be seen in Supplementary 
Information B, Table 1.
Means and standard deviations of emotional self-
awareness scores and subscales were extracted. The num-
ber of participants in each sample with TAS-20 total scores 
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of 61 or over were also extracted. To control for the effect 
of drop-outs and avoid replication in the data set, only 
scores from the final time point were extracted in longitu-
dinal studies. Authors were contacted for missing data. If 
no response was available after contacting the named con-
tact author and the first or second author twice, data were 
coded as missing.
Quality assessment
The quality of each paper was assessed quantitatively with 
a custom assessment form (see Supplementary Information 
B, Figure 1), scored from 0 (poor quality) to 19 (excellent 
quality). Quality assessment scores ranged from 2 to 15, 
with a mean score of 7.83 (SD = 2.61). Scores for each 
paper can be seen in Supplementary Information B, Table 
1. Further details of quality assessment and risk of bias can 
be seen in Supplementary Information A.
Results
Participant information
Across all 47 studies, a total of 2820 participants (23.89 % 
female) were included in analyses. Of these participants, 
534 records identified 
through database searching. 
513 records after duplicates 
removed.
513 records screened at 
abstract stage. 
445 records excluded 
at abstract stage. See 
text for rationale. 
68 full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility. 
34 records excluded 
at full-text stage. See 
text for rationale. 
34 articles selected for 
inclusion. 
47 studies identified for 
narrative synthesis. 
13 records identified through further searches 
and word of mouth. 
39 studies included in self-report meta-
analysis. Separate analyses conducted for 
other types of measurement tool. 
Figure 1. PRISMA flowchart of search process.
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1387 had a diagnosed autism spectrum disorder (21.12% 
female), compared to 1433 with no such diagnosis (25.89% 
female). In 14 of the 47 studies, diagnoses were confirmed 
with both Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI) and Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS), and a further 8 
used either the ADI or ADOS. No studies were based on 
autistic traits in typical populations. Participant ages 
ranged from 3 to 80 years. Most studies examined adults 
(33; mean age = 30.74 (5.56)), 7 examined adolescents 
(mean age = 15.17 (0.83)) and 7 examined children (mean 
age = 30.74 (5.56)). Specific data on race and socioeco-
nomic status were not available in all studies. Outline of 
recruitment methods can be seen in Supplementary 
Information A.
Group differences
Only 6 papers in this data set of 47 studies did not explic-
itly test for group differences in emotional self-awareness. 
Of the remaining 41 papers, 32 found significantly poorer 
emotional self-awareness in autism at α = 0.05. Of the 
remaining nine papers, two papers only examined TAS-20 
subscales and four papers found mixed results with multi-
ple tools (Arellano et al., 2018; Berthoz & Hill, 2005; 
Erbas et al., 2013; Silani et al., 2008). In two of these 
studies, the TAS-20 found significantly higher scores 
among autistic compared to typical populations, while the 
Bermond–Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) 
found no difference (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Silani et al., 
2008). Similarly, Arellano and colleagues (2018) found 
TAS-26 scores were significantly higher in autistic popu-
lations, but no differences emerged in BVAQ scores. 
Findings from Erbas and colleagues (2013) are explored 
in the ‘Behavioural measures’ section. Only five papers 
found no statistically significant differences in emotional 
self-awareness between groups when testing for this.
Most (42/47) papers exclusively used self-report meas-
ures. Others used parent-report measures (2), behavioural 
measures (2), and a combination of self-report and parent-
report measures (1). For details, see Supplementary 
Information B, Table 2.
Of the 43 studies that used self-report measures, 29 
used the TAS-20. A 2 (TAS-20 vs non-TAS-20) × 3 
(Significant difference vs No significant difference vs Not 
test) Chi-square tests found studies using the TAS-20 were 
not significantly more likely to find significant differences 
compared to other methods, χ2 = 4.7483, p = 0.093.
Self-report measures
Overall group differences in self-report outcomes were 
determined using a random-effects meta-analysis. Mean 
values and standard deviations were available for 39 data 
sets, with 2480 participants (1206 autistic; 1274 typical 
controls). Papers were grouped by measure used. To 
match TAS-20 scores, scores were coded so that higher 
scores reflected greater emotional self-awareness difficul-
ties. Notably, six studies used more than one self-report 
measure, leading to some samples of participants being 
included twice (Allen et al., 2013; Arellano et al., 2018; 
Berthoz et al., 2013; Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Silani et al., 
2008).
Meta-analyses demonstrated autistic participants has 
significantly greater emotional self-awareness difficulties 
across self-report outcomes, Z = 10.62, standard mean dif-
ference (SMD) = 1.16, 95% CI = [0.94, 1.37], p < 0.001. 
There was a very high, statistically significant amount of 
heterogeneity across the data set, χ2 = 243.69, I2 = 82%, 
p < 0.001. Moreover, there were significant differences 
between tools, χ2 = 30.62, I2 = 83.7%, p < 0.001, indicating 
that effect sizes differed depending on the measurement 
tool used. Therefore, analyses for each tool were examined 
separately. For sake of comparison across tools, SMDs 
were used in each case.
TAS-20. Of the 29 papers assessing group differences in 
TAS-20 scores, 27 examined adults and 2 examined ado-
lescents. Two papers did not provide required data and 
were thus excluded from analyses. A significant difference 
emerged between autistic (n = 702, M = 57.61, SD = 11.80) 
and non-autistic (n = 731, M = 42.27, SD = 9.50) partici-
pants in total TAS-20 scores, Z = 12.96, SMD = 1.47, 95% 
CI = [1.24, 1.69], p < 0.001. There was a moderate amount 
of heterogeneity, χ2 = 85.39, I2 = 70%, p < 0.001. SMD 
between TAS-20 scores by group ranged from 0.34 to 
3.29; see Figure 2 for forest plot.
The TAS-20 has three subscales: Difficulty Identifying 
Feelings (DIF), Difficulties Describing Feelings (DDF) 
and Externally Oriented Thinking (EOT). The DIF sub-
scale assesses ability to identify one’s own emotions and 
distinguish these from bodily sensations. The DDF sub-
scale assesses ability to describe and communicate feel-
ings to others. Finally, EOT assesses tendency to focus on 
external stimuli, rather than internal experiences.
DIF subscale (14 studies) scores were significantly dif-
ferent between autistic (n = 446, M = 19.41, SD = 5.77) and 
non-autistic (n = 441, M = 12.96, SD = 4.59), Z = 9.31, 
SMD = 1.16, 95% CI = [0.92, 1.40], p < 0.001. There was a 
moderate, significant amount of heterogeneity, χ2 = 33.95, 
I2 = 62%, p < 0.001.
A significant difference also emerged between autistic 
(n = 446, M = 16.53, SD = 4.52) and non-autistic (n = 441, 
M = 11.09, SD = 3.96) participants in DDF subscale (14 
studies) scores, Z = 10.87, SMD = 1.20, 95% CI = [0.098, 
1.41], p < 0.001. There was a moderate amount of hetero-
geneity, χ2 = 26.33, I2 = 51%, p < 0.001.
A significant difference emerged in EOT subscale (14 
studies) scores between autistic (n = 446, M = 20.69, 
SD = 4.50) and non-autistic (n = 441, M = 16.88, SD = 4.18) 
participants, Z = 7.16, SMD = 0.88, 95% CI = [0.64, 1.12], 
p < 0.001. There was a moderate amount of heterogeneity, 
χ2 = 35.45, I2 = 63%, p < 0.001.
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Participants with autism scored higher on average 
across all three subscales, with the magnitude of difference 
greatest for the DIF subscale and smallest for the EOT sub-
scale (see Figure 3).
Alexithymia prevalence. Overall prevalence of ‘severe 
alexithymia’ was compared in autistic and non-autistic par-
ticipants with meta-analysis of odds ratios. Alexithymia was 
classified as ‘severe’ if TAS-20 scores were 61 or above, 
Fan et al. (2014)
Minio-Paluello et al. (2009)
Berthoz et al. (2013)
Gu et al. (2015)
Katsyri et al. (2008)
Heaton et al. (2012)
Schneider et al. (2013)
Berthoz & Hill (2005)
Tani et al. (2004)
Hill, Berthoz, & Frith (2004)
Hagenmuller et al. (2014)
Samson, Huber, & Gross (2012)
Kopec, Hillier, & Fryre (2014)
Lombardo et al. (2007)
Allen, Davis & Hill (2013)
Murray et al. (2017)
Lombardo et al. (2010)
Maisel et al. (2016)
Brezis et al. (2017)
Silani et al. (2008)
Brewer et al. (2016)
Mul et al. (2018)
Brewer et al. (2017)
Krach et al. (2015)
Bernhardt et al. (2014
Milosavljevic et al. (2016)
Thaler et al. (2017)
OVERALL MEAN DIFFERENCE
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Standard Mean DIfference in TAS-20 Scores
Higher in NT | Higher in ASD














Figure 3. Average TAS-20 subscale scores across studies in autistic and non-autistic samples.
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in line with previous research (Parker et al., 2003). Preva-
lence data were available for 18 out of 29 TAS-20 studies. 
Autistic participants were significantly more likely to have 
severe alexithymia – 204 (41.0%) of the 497 autistic par-
ticipants had TAS-20 scores of 61 or above, compared to 
only 25 (4.9%) of the 508 non-autistic participants, Odds 
ratio = 10.58, 95% CI = [5.75, 19.45], p < 0.0001, with no 
significant heterogeneity, χ2 = 50.69, I2 = 36%, p = 0.07
26-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale. Only two studies in the 
current data set used the TAS-26. A random-effects meta-
analysis found TAS-26 scores were significantly higher in 
autistic participants (n = 29, M = 48.70, SD = 7.33), com-
pared to non-autistic participants (n = 38, M = 35.96, 
SD = 5.64), Z = 2.00, SMD = 1.82, 95% CI = [0.04, 3.60], 
p = 0.05. Heterogeneity was significant and high, χ2 = 8.18, 
I2 = 88%, p = 0.004.
BVAQ. There are three forms of the BVAQ: form A, B, and 
AB (Vorst & Bermond, 2001). Forms A and B are 20 items 
long. Items presented on the A and B form differ, but both 
have the same number of items for each subscale. Form 
AB is a compilation of both forms, composing of 40 items. 
Of the nine studies included in the current analysis, four 
used the BVAQ-AB, and five used the BVAQ-B. No 
studies used the BVAQ-A. One study (Duijkers et al., 
2014) was excluded for not including BVAQ average 
scores for the typically developing comparison group.
A random-effects meta-analysis was conducted. See 
Figure 4 for a forest plot of comparisons.
Total BVAQ scores were significantly higher in autistic 
(n = 235) compared to non-autistic (n = 208) participants, 
Z = 5.33, SMD = 0.80, 95% CI = [0.50, 1.09], p < 0.001. No 
significant differences between studies using the 
BVAQ-AB and the BVAQ-B were found, χ2 = 0.02, 
p = 0.88, indicating there was no interaction between-
group differences and which BVAQ version is used. A 
moderate amount of heterogeneity was found, χ2 = 13.94, 
I2 = 50%, p = 0.05.
Cognitive BVAQ scores were significantly higher in 
autistic (n = 221) compared to non-autistic (n = 187) par-
ticipants, Z = 6.61, SMD = 1.08, 95% CI = [0.76, 1.40], 
p < 0.001. No differences between studies using the 
BVAQ-AB and the BVAQ-B were found, χ2 = 0.03, p = 
0.85. A significant amount of moderate heterogeneity was 
found, χ2 = 12.39, I2 = 52%, p = 0.05.
No significant effect of group was found in affective 
BVAQ scores (autistic, n = 221, non-autistic, n = 187), 
Z = 1.38, SMD = 0.15, 95% CI = [−0.06, 0.377], p = 0.17. 
No differences between studies using the BVAQ-AB and 
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Figure 4. Forest plot of standard mean differences between autistic and non-autistic participants in BVAQ total and component 
scores.
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BVAQ-B were found, χ2 = 0.27, p = 0.60, and no statistical 
heterogeneity was detected, χ2 = 6.75, I2 = 11%, p = 0.34.
Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory–Intrapersonal Scale. Of 
the four studies that use the Bar-ON EQ-I, intrapersonal 
subscale scores were available for three studies. Random-
effects meta-analyses found no significant differences 
between groups (autistic, n = 72, M = 96.51, SD = 16.09; 
non-autistic, n = 72, M = 96.23, SD = 12.84), Z = 0.09, 
SMD = 0.03, 95% CI = [−0.83, 0.78], p = 0.93. Statistical 
heterogeneity was significant and high, χ2 = 10.84, I2 = 82%, 
p = 0.004.
Emotional Awareness Questionnaire–Differentiation Subscale. 
The Emotional Awareness Questionnaire–Differentiation 
Subscale (EAQ-diff) was used in two studies. A random-
effects meta-analysis found no significant difference in 
EAQ-diff between groups (autistic, n = 122, M = 2.15, 
SD = 16.09; non-autistic, n = 174, M = 2.35, SD = 12.84), 
Z = 1.21, SMD = −0.18, 95% CI = [−0.95, 0.23], p = 0.23. 
Heterogeneity was high and significant, χ2 = 5.90, p < 
0.001, I2 = 83%.
Children’s Alexithymia Questionnaire. Two studies use the 
Children’s Alexithymia Questionnaire (CAQ). A random-
effects meta-analysis found CAQ did not significantly dif-
fer between groups (autistic, n = 45, M = 18.89, SD = 16.09; 
non-autistic, n = 52, M = 15.55, SD = 12.84), Z = 1.83, 
SMD = 0.60, 95% CI = [−0.004, 1.24], p = 0.07. Heteroge-
neity was not statistically significant, χ2 = 2.38, p = 0.12, 
I2 = 58%.
Other-report measures
In the three studies which used other-report measures (Costa 
et al., 2017; Griffin et al., 2016; Trevisan et al., 2016), two 
measurement tools were identified: the Children’s 
Alexithymia Measure (CAM-PR; Way et al., 2010) and the 
Alexithymia Questionnaire for Children (ACQ-P; Costa 
et al., 2017). Both were specifically intended for use with 
children, to be filled in by the parents or carers.
The CAM-PR (Way et al., 2010) is a 14-item observer-
report measure of alexithymia, intended for children 
between ages 5 and 17 years. Initial validity work found 
the CAM-PR has high internal consistency and good con-
current validity with other measures of alexithymia, pro-
ducing a unidimensional measure of alexithymia in 
children. The CAM-PR was developed through focus 
group work, expert panel feedback, and psychometric 
analysis of questionnaire data.
The ACQ-P (Costa et al., 2017) is a 20-item observer-
report measure of alexithymia. The ACQ-P is an adapta-
tion of the self-report CAQ (Rieffe et al., 2006), a version 
of the TAS-20, with the questions reformulated to be par-
ent-report items. The ACQ-P shows good internal 
consistency, and a three-factor structure in line with the 
TAS-20 (Costa et al., 2017).
Two studies in the current data set utilised the CAM, 
and one used the ACQ-P. All three studies were compared 
with random-effects meta-analysis. Autistic participants 
(n = 79) had significantly more emotional self-awareness 
difficulties compared to non-autistic participants (n = 90), 
Z = 6.30, SMD = 1.26, 95% CI = [0.87, 1.65], p < 0.001. No 
significant heterogeneity was detected, χ2 = 0.35, p = 0.56, 
I2 = 0%.
Behavioural measures
Three behavioural measures were identified in two papers: 
the Multiple Emotions Task (MET; Rieffe et al., 2007), 
Photo Emotion Differentiation Task (PED-task; Erbas 
et al., 2013), and the Emotion Sorting Task (ES task; Erbas 
et al., 2013).
In the MET, participants listen to a story intended to 
elicit emotion, paired with a simple illustration. 
Participants are invited to select the emotion that they 
would feel in each situation. In the PED-task, partici-
pants view emotional images paired with various nega-
tive emotional terms, rating how strongly each image 
evoked each discrete emotional state. Differentiation was 
calculated by examining correlations between emotion 
ratings. In the ES task, participants were asked to sort 20 
negative emotional words into groups according to how 
the words ‘belong together’. Differentiation was quanti-
fied through number of groups that the participants 
divided words into. These measurement tools were 
judged as too different to conduct meaningful meta-ana-
lytic comparisons.
Rieffe and colleagues (2007) found that children with 
autism identified significantly fewer emotional perspec-
tives per story compared to their typically developing 
counterparts on the MET, F(1, 42) = 4.64, p = 0.03. Erbas 
and colleagues (2013) found that participants with autism 
showed significantly less emotional differentiation than 
typically developing participants in the PED-task, 
U = 107.00, p = 0.04, but this only approached statistical 
significance in the ES task, U = 114.00, p = 0.06.
Comparisons by age group
To assess whether emotional self-awareness may change 
over time, group differences were compared at four differ-
ent age ranges: 12 years and under (8 studies), 13–16 years 
(6 studies), 17–30 years (16 studies), and 31 years or over 
(18 studies). Studies were categorised based on the aver-
age age of the autistic sample. Only self-report measures 
were used, to control for the effects of differing method-
ologies, and studies where age data were not available 
were excluded. Consequently, 38 studies were included in 
the final analyses (12 years and under = 4 studies; 
Huggins et al. 315
13–16 years = 4 studies; 17–30 years = 14 studies; 31+ 
years = 16 studies). See Figure 5 for forest plot.
In children 12 years old and younger, no differences 
between autistic (n = 129) and non-autistic participants 
(n = 188) were found, Z = 0.10, SMD = 0.03, 95% 
CI = [−0.52, 0.58], p = 0.92. Heterogeneity was both high 
and significant, χ2 = 13.80, I2 = 78%, p = 0.006.
In adolescents of age 13–16 years, a significant, moder-
ate effect size of group was found, Z = 5.01, SMD = 0.63, 
95% CI = [0.38, 0.88], p < 0.001. Autistic participants 
(n = 146) showed significantly less emotional self-aware-
ness compared to non-autistic participants (n = 129). No 
significant statistical heterogeneity was observed, 
χ2 = 2.21, I2 = 0%, p = 0.53.
A large, significant effect of group emerged in the stud-
ies assessing self-report emotional self-awareness in autis-
tic (n = 390) and non-autistic (n = 353) participants of age 
17–30 years, Z = 6.67, SMD = 1.33, 95% CI = [0.94, 1.72], 
p < 0.001. Heterogeneity was large and significant, 
χ2 = 69.96, I2 = 67%, p < 0.0001.
Finally, a large and significant difference emerged 
between autistic (n = 356) and non-autistic (n = 393) in the 
age 31 and above group, Z = 13.31, SMD = 1.58, 95% 
CI = [1.35, 1.82], p < 0.001. Statistical heterogeneity was 
significant but moderate, χ2 = 28.20, I2 = 47%, p = 0.02. 
Differences between age groups were significant, 
χ2 = 46.22, I2 = 93.5%, p < 0.001. These findings suggest 
that age is associated with increasing disparity in emotional 
self-awareness between autistic and non-autistic groups. 
Correlation analyses align with this, finding that SMD 
scores were significantly correlated with mean age of par-
ticipants, r(35) = 0.672, p < 0.001.
We next assessed whether changes in emotional self-
awareness with age were associated with changes in autis-
tic or typical groups. As measurement tools were not 
comparable, this analysis was done with TAS-20 scores 
only. Correlation analyses compared mean TAS-20 scores 
for autistic and non-autistics groups to overall mean age 
score in the study. Among autistic participants, greater 
mean age was associated with greater TAS-20 scores, 
r(23) = 0.456, p = 0.022. No significant association between 
age and TAS-20 scores emerged for the typical controls, 
r(23) = −0.089, p = 0.672 (see Figure 6). These findings 
suggest that emotional self-awareness worsened with age 
among the autistic but not typical populations.
Discussion
Emotional self-awareness is increasingly recognised as an 
important predictor of socioemotional outcomes, particu-
larly in autism. Despite this, there is still little understanding 
of how and when emotional self-awareness difficulties 
arise, and how methodological biases influence these out-
comes. We first replicated Kinnaird et al.’s (2019) findings 
that emotional self-awareness is diminished in autism. 
However, the strength of this effect varied by measurement 
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tool, with the strongest effect sizes found in studies using 
the TAS-20. Furthermore, as we illustrated in the first part of 
the review (Huggins et al., 2020), few studies used observer-
report or behavioural methods, further details can be seen in 
first part of review.
We identified divergent developmental patterns of emo-
tional self-awareness in autistic and non-autistic groups. 
While no differences emerged in pre-adolescent children, 
differences emerged during adolescence and increased 
with age. Moreover, correlational analyses suggest that 
this relates to declining abilities in the autistic group, rather 
than increasing ability in the non-autistic group. This 
developmental pattern bears a resemblance to other devel-
opmental patterns in autism, such as facial emotion recog-
nition (Lozier et al., 2014) and eye-gaze (Black et al., 
2017).
Interoceptive accuracy likewise decreases with age in 
autistic populations (Mash et al., 2017), albeit only in par-
ticipants with IQs lower than 115. Interoceptive abilities 
are fundamental to forming a conscious awareness of one’s 
own emotions (Craig, 2003; Seth, 2013). Thus, declining 
emotional self-awareness in autism may stem from increas-
ing interoceptive difficulties. However, this does not 
explain why such difficulties should arise with age. One 
possibility is that autistic people may develop greater 
awareness of their difficulties with age and thus become 
more likely to report poorer emotional self-awareness.
Another possible explanation is the prevalence of 
comorbid mental health difficulties in autism (Lai et al., 
2019; Simonoff et al., 2008). Poorer emotional self-aware-
ness is associated with depression (Demiralp et al., 2012) 
and anxiety (Kashdan & Farmer, 2014). The TAS-20 tends 
to be associated with general negative affect (Lumley, 
2000), and has been suggested to measure psychological 
distress rather than a stable trait (Leising et al., 2009), 
suggesting that emotional self-awareness may fluctuate 
with mental health.
During adolescence and adulthood, autistic symptoms 
tend to abate, while depression and anxiety symptoms 
often become more severe (Anderson et al., 2011). The 
gap in social skills between autistic children and their 
peers also widens during adolescence (Church et al., 
2000), increasing the risk of social isolation or victimisa-
tion. Such difficulties likely continue into adulthood, 
with autistic adults less likely to be employed or in higher 
education (Wehman et al., 2014). This social isolation 
deprives autistic people of social and emotional learning 
opportunities compared to their peers, contributing to 
impaired development of social cognitive abilities, 
including emotional self-awareness. Furthermore, these 
increased mental health issues and greater social isola-
tion are likely to result in diminished self-beliefs in soci-
oemotional competence.
Few studies in our review controlled for comorbid 
mental health issues. As such, it remains difficult to exam-
ine the extent to which emotional self-awareness difficul-
ties relates to autism itself, or mental health problems in 
this population. Future research may benefit from control-
ling for differences in depression and anxiety symptoms 
between groups.
In addition, few studies controlled for cognitive ability 
and verbal skills. Previous research suggests that greater 
alexithymia is associated with lower verbal IQ 
(Montebarocci et al., 2011), and greater verbal ability pre-
dicts greater emotion differentiation (Israelashvili et al., 
2019). As such, emotional self-awareness may also depend 
on general cognitive ability, as well as emotional vocabu-
lary. However, the majority of these studies focused on 
populations with average-to-high cognitive ability, limit-
ing variability. Nevertheless, future research should exam-
ine the extent to which vocabulary or cognitive ability 
predicts emotional self-awareness in autism.
While self-report data indicates that pre-adolescent autis-
tic children did not differ from their peers in emotional self-
awareness, parent-report outcomes found that autism was 
associated with poorer emotional self-awareness (Costa 
et al., 2017; Griffin et al., 2016; Trevisan 2016). As such, 
this finding may result from the use of self-report measures, 
with younger children being more likely to overestimate 
their competence.
Little work has compared parent and self-report meas-
ures of emotional self-awareness. In Griffin and col-
leagues’ (2016) study, neurotypical children had higher 
self-reported alexithymia compared to parent-reported 
alexithymia. By comparison, parents of autistic children 
made similar alexithymia ratings compared to their chil-
dren. This suggests that parents of typical children 
may overestimate their child’s abilities, whereas autistic 
children and their parents tend to make similar estimates. 
If this is the case, the area of inconsistency lies in neither 












Figure 6. Scatterplot showing average age of group against 
mean emotional self-awareness difficulties.
Huggins et al. 317
between neurotypical children and their parents. This fur-
ther demonstrates the need for research utilising both par-
ent- and self-report measures.
The lack of behavioural tools to assess emotional self-
awareness make it difficult to make sense of these findings. 
Without an objective point of comparison, it is difficult to 
assess whether children overestimate their abilities, or 
whether parents under-estimate them. Parents in these stud-
ies will have full knowledge of their child’s diagnostic status 
and the associated stereotypes may influence parent-report 
outcomes. Furthermore, autistic children may be less likely 
to communicate their own emotional states to peers and 
adults, due to either communication difficulties or anxiety, 
leading to the misconception they lack self-awareness of 
them. A key implication of our review is that future research 
should attempt to implement objective measures alongside 
other-report and self-report measures. This will allow 
researchers to examine whether emotional self-awareness 
difficulties in autism result from report-bias, as well as when 
difficulties emerge during development.
A further limitation of our review is the relatively lim-
ited age range of the data set. Very few studies have exam-
ined autism beyond young adulthood, making it difficult to 
assess how this developmental trajectory may change in 
later life. Previous research has found that emotional self-
awareness becomes worse with increasing age in the gen-
eral population (Mattila et al., 2006) – such an effect may 
be particularly negative in autism.
Finally, there was a limited number of studies examin-
ing emotional self-awareness in pre-adolescent children. 
This likely links to the reliance on self-report measures in 
the wider literature, as such methods are often not suitable 
for very young children, particularly in autistic groups, 
where verbal and cognitive delays are common. As a result, 
our current findings are based on a relatively small pool of 
studies for children of age 12 years and below. Future 
research may benefit from finding more ways to examine 
this key psychological construct in young samples.
We found that while emotional self-awareness was 
diminished in autism across different measurement tools, 
these difficulties do not seem to be present in early child-
hood. Instead, emotional self-awareness difficulties 
emerge during adolescence and worsen with age. However, 
our findings are limited by the reliance on self-report 
measures in the literature. Future research would benefit 
from including observer-report and behavioural methods 
of measuring emotional self-awareness, to account for 
self-bias. Finally, our review suggests that adolescence 
may be a critical period for emotional self-awareness 
development in autism. Targeting emotional self-aware-
ness in autistic children may protect against the increasing 
emotional and social challenges of adolescence.
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